Contrastive studies of languages usually focus on differences in lexical items, syntactic structures, pragmatic expressions, and so on. In this paper we take a cognitive pragmatic approach, assuming that metarepresentation is a crucial perspective in such studies. We discuss that higher-level expressions are explicitly realized in both the Japanese and the Korean languages. We also point out that various linguistic phenomena such as metarepresentational indicators, sentence-final particles, and private predicates behave in nearly the same way in Japanese and Korean. Finally, we suggest that in these two languages public representations of utterances may be linguistically distinguished from mental representations.

**Abstract**

Contrastive studies of languages usually focus on differences in lexical items, syntactic structures, pragmatic expressions, and so on. In this paper we take a cognitive pragmatic approach, assuming that metarepresentation is a crucial perspective in such studies. We discuss that higher-level expressions are explicitly realized in both the Japanese and the Korean languages. We also point out that various linguistic phenomena such as metarepresentational indicators, sentence-final particles, and private predicates behave in nearly the same way in Japanese and Korean. Finally, we suggest that in these two languages public representations of utterances may be linguistically distinguished from mental representations.

**Key words** relevance theory, higher-level explicature, metarepresentation, public representation, mental representation

1. Introduction

We represent a state of affairs in our thoughts or utterance. For example, suppose John thinks that the German football team plays very well. It is a mental representation of the state of affairs. If he says, “The German team plays very well,” it is a public representation of the state of affairs.1) We represent the state of affairs by resemblance in form or content. We also represent another representation of others or ourselves at some other time. We think or say, “John believes/said that the German football team plays very well.” This is a metarepresentation of John’s thought or utterance.2)

Recent papers in relevance theory are particularly concerned with the metarepresentational aspects of communication. Sperber (1994) seems to be the starting point of this trend and substantial discussions are found in Sperber (ed.) (2000), Wilson (2000), Noh (2000), and Sperber and Wilson (2002).

According to Wilson (2000: 411), a metarepresentation is “a representation of a representation: a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded within it.” Sperber (2000: 3) focuses on linguistic metarepresentation and presents four types of metarepresentation, as in (1).
(1)  a. mental representations of mental representations
    b. mental representations of public representations
    c. public representations of mental representations
    d. public representations of public representations

Each instance of (1) is shown in (2) respectively.

(2)  a. the thought “John believes that it will rain”
    b. the thought “John said that it will rain”
    c. the utterance “John believes that it will rain”
    d. the utterance “John said that it will rain”

That is, if we guess that John believes in his mind that it will rain, we are metarepresenting his belief. If John said, “It will rain,” then we can metarepresent his utterance by saying “John said that it will rain.” In these instances, we attribute the thought and the utterance to John.

The presence of a metarepresentation can be overtly indicated or left implicit for the hearer to infer. These indications are mandatory in some languages and optional in others.

As Wilson (2000) comments, language contains a huge variety of metarepresentational devices. These metarepresentational devices vary across languages. In this paper, we examine metarepresentational phenomena in Japanese and Korean and compare them with English ones. Japanese and Korean are similar in grammar, including the SOV-word order, and share many characteristics that English does not have.

This paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the terms explicature and higher-level explicature, as defined and used in relevance theory. Section 3 discusses Japanese and Korean metarepresentational devices. Section 4 concludes.

2. Explicature and Higher-level Explicature in Relevance Theory

Explicatures in relevance theory are distinctively different from “what is said” in the sense of Grice (1989). Carston defines explicatures as (3).

(3)  An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an ‘explicature’ of the utterance if and only if it is a development of (a) a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential subpart of a logical form. (Carston 2002: 124)

According to this definition, we can recover one of the explicatures of utterance (4) as (5) (Wilson and Sperber 1993).
(4) Peter told Mary that he was tired.

(5) Peter Brown told Mary Green at 3.00 p.m. on June 23, 1992, that Peter Brown was tired at 3.00 p.m. on June 23, 1992.

In addition to this ‘basic’ explicature, Wilson and Sperber (1993) introduces ‘higher-level explicature,’ which is realized by an implicit verb phrase set higher than what is explicitly stated, mainly reflecting the speech acts performed and the speaker’s propositional attitudes. (7a-c) will be candidates for the higher-level explicatures of Mary’s utterance in (6).

(6) Peter: Can you help me to find a job?  
Mary (sadly): I can’t.

(7) a. Mary says that she can’t help Peter to find a job.  
   b. Mary believes that she can’t help Peter to find a job.  
   c. Mary regrets that she can’t help Peter to find a job.

The higher-level explicature in (7a) is a speech-act description, and those in (7b) and (7c) are propositional attitude descriptions. (7a) and (7b) are encoded by the sentence type, but (7c) is contextually inferred. The basic speech act is based on the sentence type of the utterance, as in (8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sentence type</th>
<th>speech act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>declarative sentence</td>
<td>saying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interrogative sentence</td>
<td>questioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imperative sentence</td>
<td>ordering/requesting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, sentences may have higher-level explicatures such as “I say that . . .,” “I ask . . .,” and “I order/request . . .,” respectively.

It has been pointed out by relevance theorists that B’s utterance in (9) is ambiguous between (10a) or (10b) (cf. Blass 1990: 22, Uchida 1998, 2002).\(^3\)

(9) A: What did Susan say?  
    B: You’ve dropped your purse.

(10) a. Susan said that you (= A) have dropped your purse.  
     b. You (= A) have dropped your purse.

Possible appropriate Japanese sentences corresponding to (10a) and (10b) would be (11a) and (11b),
respectively. This can be shown as in (12).

\[(11)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Kimino saifu ga ochita to itta / Kimino saifu ga ochita-tte.} \\
& \text{your purse Part dropped Comp said Part} \\
\text{b. } & \text{(Kimino) saifu ga ochita yo.} \\
& \text{Part}
\end{align*}
\]

\[(12)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. You’ve dropped your purse to itta / -tte.} \\
\text{b. You’ve dropped your purse yo.}
\end{align*}
\]

Notice that ‘to itta’ and ‘-tte’ in (12a) and ‘yo’ in (12b) are attached to the original English sentence. ‘To itta’ consists of a quotative particle ‘to’ and verb ‘iu,’ (‘say’) and ‘-tte’ is an informal variation of the particle ‘to,’ so that both ‘to itta’ and ‘-tte’ tell us that the preceding parts are being reported. ‘Yo’ conveys that the speaker tells the hearer the information that the former believes the latter does not know at the time of speaking. In Japanese there are two different utterances for the two interpretations.

Let us look at (9) to (12) above from the viewpoint of higher-level explicatures. The two interpretations of the ambiguous utterance (9B), that is, (10a) and (10b), may have higher-level explicatures, (13a) and (13b), respectively.

\[(13)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{B: You’ve dropped your purse.} \\
\text{a. } & \text{[B says that [Susan said that A has dropped A’s purse.]]} \\
\text{b. } & \text{[B says that [A has dropped A’s purse.]]}
\end{align*}
\]

In (13), the explicature of (a) is [Susan said that A has dropped A’s purse], and the explicature of (b) is [A has dropped A’s purse].

In contrast, the Japanese counterparts explicitly encode the information, as in (14)-(15).

\[(14)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. You’ve dropped your purse -tte / to itta.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{[B says that [Susan said that you ( = A) have dropped your purse.]]}
\end{align*}
\]

\[(15)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. You’ve dropped your purse yo.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{[B is telling you ( = A) that [you have dropped your purse.]]}
\end{align*}
\]

In Japanese, -to itta means ‘said that . . .’ and -tte is a hearsay particle (cf. Itani 1996). The particle yo means the transmission of new information and can be paraphrased by ‘I’m telling you.’

Let us analyze the dialogue of (16) again and the candidates for the higher-level explicatures of Mary’s utterance in (17), repeated from (6)-(7).
Peter: Can you help me to find a job?
Mary (sadly): I can’t.

(17) a. Mary says that she can’t help Peter to find a job.
b. Mary believes that she can’t help Peter to find a job.
c. Mary regrets that she can’t help Peter to find a job.

It is clear that those higher-level explicatures are metarepresented in the addressee’s (Peter’s) mind. If Peter processes Mary’s utterance in (16), he may interpret it to convey those in (17). That is, “Mary says” in (17a), “Mary believes” in (17b), and “Mary regrets” in (17c) are metarepresented in Peter’s mind as the higher-level explicatures of Mary’s utterance.

The whole picture will be complicated when a third party intervenes. Consider the conversation in (18).

(18) Peter: Can Mary help me to find a job?
Tom: She said she couldn’t.

A possible higher-level explication expressed by Tom’s utterance is shown in (19).

(19) [Tom says [Mary said she couldn’t help Peter to find a job.]]

Here, Tom’s metarepresentation of Mary’s utterance is reflected in the inner brackets, [Mary said she can’t help Peter to find a job]. If Tom’s utterance is metarepresented by Peter, it may look like (19). In the sections to follow, we will show that in Japanese and Korean, metarepresentational devices that contribute to higher-level explications are linguistically realized, and even grammaticalized, in some cases.

3. Metarepresentations in Japanese and Korean

3.1. Metarepresentational devices of higher-level explications

There are words and phrases in language that explicitly indicate this kind of metarepresentational uses. English, for example, has a range of quotative devices. Wilson (2000:430) gives examples of devices such as (20).

(20) a. hearsay adverbs: allegedly, reportedly
b. adjectives: self-confessed, so-called
c. particles: quote-unquote
d. parentheses: *as Chomsky says, according to Bill*

e. noun phrases: *Derrida’s claim that, the suspect’s allegation that*

They are all lexical items that have conceptual meanings, and we also find their lexical counterparts in Japanese and Korean.

However, it is not always the case that there is a one-to-one correspondence between these languages. Suppose that Peter says to Jane the following utterances in (21).\(^4\)

\[
\begin{align*}
(21) & \quad \text{a. John has left, in case you haven’t heard.} \\
& \quad \text{b. Why is Paul leaving, since you know so much?} \\
& \quad \text{c. If that’s John, I’m not here.} \\
& \quad \text{d. Mary was pretty rude to me. I am neglecting my job!}
\end{align*}
\]

The italicized expressions seem to be related to the higher-level explicatures of the remaining parts, although there are no explicit indications of them. In contrast, in Japanese and Korean, these adverbial expressions cannot be used without higher-level metarepresentational expressions. Consider the Japanese examples in (22) and the Korean ones in (23).

\[
\begin{align*}
(22) & \quad \text{a. Kiite nai to ikenai node imasu ga, John wa deteiki mashita.} \\
& \quad \text{Hear not Part in case Part say (polite) Part John Part left (polite) } \\
& \quad \text{‘In case you haven’t heard, I tell you, John has left.’} \\
& \quad \text{b. Kimi wa nandemo shitte-iru kara kiku-noda-kedo, doshite Paul wa deteiku no?} \\
& \quad \text{you Part everything know since ask (you) Part why Paul Part are leaving Part} \\
& \quad \text{‘Since you know everything, I ask you, why is Paul leaving?’} \\
& \quad \text{c. Moshi John dattara, watashi wa inai to itte-kudasai.} \\
& \quad \text{if John was I Part not here Comp say (polite) } \\
& \quad \text{‘If that’s John, tell him that I’m not here.’} \\
& \quad \text{d. Mary tara totemento shitsurei nanda. Boku ga surubeki koto wo shite inai to iunda.} \\
& \quad \text{Mary Part very rude was Part I Part job to do Comp Part not do that said} \\
& \quad \text{‘Mary was pretty rude. She said I’m neglecting my job.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(23) & \quad \text{a. Ney-ka tutci mos ha-yss-ta-myen malha-nuntye John-un ttena-ss-e.} \\
& \quad \text{You-Nom hear-not did-DC-if say-Con John-Top left-DC} \\
& \quad \text{‘If you haven’t heard, I tell you, John left.’} \\
& \quad \text{b. Ne-nun muetunci ani-kka mut-nuntye way John-i ttena-ss-ni?} \\
& \quad \text{You-Top everything know-since ask you-Part why John-Nom left-Q} \\
& \quad \text{‘As you know everything, I ask you, why did John leave?’}
\end{align*}
\]
In (22) and (23), each higher-level expression has an overt indication that it contributes to the higher-level explicature of the utterance. The underlined phrases above are obligatory, which sharply contrasts with the English expressions in (21).

Let us examine a case of the connective *because*. In English a *because*-clause modifies the explicature or a higher-level explicature of a clause, as in (24) (see Wilson 2000: 431).

(24)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. The grass is wet, because it’s raining.
  \item b. It’s raining, because the grass is wet.
\end{itemize}

In (24a), the *because*-clause explains why the grass is wet. In other words, the rain has caused the grass to get wet. In (24b), the *because*-clause explains the reason why the speaker believes or says that it is raining. The fact that the grass is wet has caused the speaker to believe or say that it is raining. Sweetser (1990) claims that the first *because* functions in the content domain, while the second *because* operates in the epistemic or speech act domain.

In Korean and Japanese, in the case of (24b), “I think” or “I say” has to be overtly used as can be seen in (25).

(25)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. Pi-ka wa-se phul-i cece-ess-ta.  
    Rain-Nom come-because grass-Nom wet-Pst-DC  
    ‘Because it is raining, the grass is wet.’
  \item b. ??:phul-i cece-se pi-ka on-ta.  
    Grass-Nom wet-because rain-Nom come-DC  
    ‘Because the grass is wet, it is raining.’
  \item c. phul-i cece-se pi-ka oko ista-ko sayngakhan-ta.  
    Grass-Nom wet-because rain-Nom coming-that think-DC  
    ‘Because the grass is wet, I think that it is raining.’
\end{itemize}

In (25a), the sentence means that raining causes the grass to get wet. In (25b), it means that the wet grass causes the rain to come. If the *se*-clause ‘*because*-clause’ is to be interpreted as relating to the speaker’s thought, the clause needs to have ‘I think’ as in (25c).
Similarly, in Japanese, (24a) can be translated literally as in (26a), but (24b) cannot, as seen in (26b). It should be translated as a clause with the expression “I think,” as in (26c).

(26) a. Ame ga futte-iru node kusa ga nurete-iru.
Rain Part is falling because grass Part is wet
‘Because it is raining, the grass is wet.’
b. ??Kusa ga nurete-iru node ame ga futte-iru.
Grass Part is wet because rain Part falling
‘Because the grass is wet, it is raining.’
c. Kusa ga nurete-iru node ame ga futte-iru to omou.
Grass Part is wet because rain Part falling Comp think
‘Because the grass is wet, I think that it is raining.’

Thus in Korean and Japanese, the verb of the speech act or propositional attitude needs to be overt when a because-clause modifies it.

There is another case where the presence of metarepresentation has to be overtly indicated. Consider (27), from Wilson (2000: 15).

(27) a. Why is it that we curry favour?
b. Why is it that someone who tries to convert others proselytizes?
c. Why is it that we trip the light fantastic if we go out for a good evening?
d. Why is it that we have to take off our shoes before entering a mosque?
e. Why is it that gorillas beat their chests?
f. Why is it that we get butterflies in our stomachs when we are nervous?

As Wilson comments, questions (27a)-(27c) are more likely to be interpreted as metalinguistic. For example, (27a) can be rephrased as, “Why is it that we say we ‘curry favour’?” In contrast, in (27d) and (27e), questions are interpreted as descriptive. The question in (27f) can be descriptive or metalinguistic. Actually, in (27a)-(27f), both interpretations are possible, but one or the other seems to be more readily accessible.

In contrast, in Korean and Japanese, questions (27a) through (27f) are exclusively interpreted as descriptive. For a metalinguistic interpretation, the questions need an overt linguistic indicator such as “we say.” Consider the Korean questions in (28)-(29), where Thokki-ka panga-lul ccihnun-ta ‘A rabbit is pounding grain with a pestle’ is used to describe the shadow on the moon, and pihayngki-lul thaywun -ta ‘take somebody on an airplane’ idiomatically means ‘flatter somebody.’

(28) a. way thokki-ka panga-lul ccih-nun ke-ni?
Why rabbit-Nom pound grain with a pestle-is it that-Q
‘Why is it that the rabbit pounds grain with a pestle?’
b. way thokki-ka panga-lul ccihnunta-ko ha-nun ke-ni?
Why rabbit-Nom pound grain with a pestle-Comp say-is it that-Q
‘Why is it that they say a rabbit is pounding grain with a pestle?’

(29) a. way pihayngki-lul thaywu-nun ke-ni?
Why airplane-AC take on-is it that-Q
‘Why is it that you take me on an airplane?’
b. way pihayngki-lul thaywunta-ko ha-nun ke-ni?
Why airplane-AC take on-Comp say-is it that-Q
‘Why is it that they say ‘take on an airplane’?’

In (28), if we want to ask why we say Thokki-ka panga-lul ccihnunta, we have to phrase it as in (28b). If -ko ha ‘say that’ is not used, as in (28a), it is interpreted as descriptive, meaning, ‘Why does the rabbit pound grain with a pestle?’ In a similar vein, in (29), without ‘say that,’ it is interpreted descriptively, and with ‘say that,’ it is interpreted metalinguistically.

There is a very similar expression to describe the shadow on the moon in Japanese, too. As in Korean, ‘we say’-expressions are necessary in metalinguistic questions, as in (30b) and (31b).

(30) a. Naze usagi ga mochi wo tsuite-iru no-daro?
Why rabbit Part rice cake Part is making Comp-Q
‘Why is the rabbit making rice cake?’
b. Naze usagi ga mochi wo tsuite-iru to-iu no-daro?.
Why rabbit Part rice cake Part is making Comp say Comp-Q
‘Why do they say the rabbit is making rice cake?’

(31) a. Naze saba wo yomu no-daro?
Why mackerel Part read Comp-Q
‘Why do they count the number of mackerels?’
b. Naze saba wo yomu to-iu no-daro?
Why mackerel Part read Comp say Comp-Q
‘Why do they say count the number of mackerels (when they try to cheat someone by giving a wrong number)?’

Finally, as discussed in section 2, B’s utterance in (32) is generally analyzed as ambiguous between (33a) and (33b), repeated from (9) and (10).
(32) A: What did Susan say?
   B: You’ve dropped your purse.

(33) a. Susan said that you (= A) have dropped your purse.
   b. You (= A) have dropped your purse.

As we have seen in (11) above, the ambiguity in English (32B) is not maintained in Japanese, because the sentences have to end with different particles.

Similarly, in Korean, the two interpretations are conveyed by sentences with different sentence-final particles. If it is a metarepresentation of Susan’s public representation ((33a)), it has to end with ko ha [. . . that say] or the hearsay particle tay, as in (34a), and if it is a metarepresentation of B’s own thought, it ends with a declarative sentence-type particle, as in (34b).

(34) a. Cikap-itteleci-ess-[ta-ko ha-yss-e/tay].
   ‘She said you dropped your purse.’
   b. Cikap-itteleci-ess-e.
   ‘You dropped your purse.’

So far we have looked at cases where English sentences are ambiguous between descriptive and metarepresentational interpretations but Japanese and Korean counterparts are not, because in these languages, metarepresentational interpretations have to be overtly indicated.

3.2. Metarepresentations and sentence-final particles

In English, sentence types or moods are typically expressed in terms of sentence forms: declarative sentences have a basic word order of [subject + predicate]; imperatives are usually realized by using the bare infinitive verb form without the subject ‘you’; and interrogatives require ‘do’ support and the reverse order of [subject + verb], as we can see in (35).

(35) a. I get up at six.
   b. Get up at six!
   c. Do you get up at six?

The Japanese counterparts of (35) can be expressed, as follows.

(36) a. Watashi wa 6 ji ni oki-masu.
I Part 6 o’clock at get up-DC(polite)
‘I get up at six.’
b. 6 ji ni oki-nasai.
6 o’clock at get up-Imp(polite)
‘Get up at six.’
c. Anata wa 6 ji ni oki-masu-ka?
you Part 6 o’clock at get up (polite)-Q
‘Do you get up at six?’

As is shown, sentence-final particles play a vital role in indicating sentence types in Japanese: -masu and -nasai are a declarative and an imperative marker respectively, and ka is a particle indicating that the sentence is a question.8)

Similarly, Korean sentence-final particles are also used to indicate the sentence-type, as in (37).

(37) a. na-nun 6 si-e y ilena-ta.
I-Top 6 o’clock-at get up-DC
‘I get up at 6 o’clock.’
b. 6 si-e y ilena-la!
6 o’clock-at get up-Imp
‘Get up at 6 o’clock.’
c. ne-nun 6 si-e y ilena-ni?
you-Top 6 o’clock-at get up-Q
‘Do you get up at 6 o’clock?’

The particle ta in (37a) indicates a declarative sentence; la in (37b) an imperative sentence; and ni in (37c) an interrogative sentence. In relevance theory, imperative sentences are describing desirable states of affairs, and interrogative sentences are metarepresenting desirable thoughts if they are relevant (Wilson and Sperber 1988).

A sentence can be used to perform various kinds of speech acts, in addition to the basic speech acts as in (36) and (37) above. Suppose that Peter says (38) to Mary.

(38) Peter: Jane is coming toward us.

The utterance can perform several speech acts, depending on the context, as in the schemata below.

(39) a. [Peter informs [Jane is coming toward us]]
b. [Peter warns [Jane is coming toward us]]
c. [Peter confirms [Jane is coming toward us]]

d. [Peter expects [Jane is coming toward us]]

In Japanese and Korean, many sentence-final particles limit the range of available speech acts. Consider the Japanese particles and the main speech acts for which they can be used.

(40) a. Jane is coming toward us-\textit{yo}. (informing)
b. Jane is coming toward us-\textit{zo}. (warning)
c. Jane is coming toward us-\textit{ne}. (confirming)
d. Jane is coming toward us-\textit{na}. (expecting)

These particles do not convey a specific speech act itself, but rather provide information to guide the addressee to the intended speech act. For example, \textit{yo} typically performs a speech act of informing new information, which can function as a warning, as well. Consider (41).

(41) a. \textbf{Kuruma ga kuru-\textit{yo}}.
    car Part (is) coming-\textit{yo}
    ‘A car is coming.’
b. \textbf{Ame ga furu-\textit{yo}}.
    rain Part (is going to) fall-\textit{yo}
    ‘It’s going to rain.’

Both (41a) and (41b) are typical cases of indirect speech acts. (41a) tells the hearer that a car is approaching and, at the same time, performs a speech act of warning. Along the same line, (41b) is also an indirect speech act of advice such as, “You should take an umbrella when you go out.”

The particle \textit{zo} in (40b) is a rather rude way of speaking, mainly used by males. It can be used to express two kinds of speech acts; informing and warning. (40b) may simply convey information that Jane is coming toward them. (40b) will also be interpreted as a warning when the speaker intends to implicate that the hearer should be careful because “she’s coming toward us.”

\textit{Ne} is one of the most frequently used sentence-final particles in conversation, typically confirming information that is known to both the speaker and hearer. In the case of (40c) above, the meaning will be something like “You see, she’s coming toward us.” It can also convey some kind of propositional attitude by confirming what is going on in front of both the speaker and hearer. Let us consider the utterances that follow.

(42) a. \textbf{Ima goro ikunda-\textit{ne}}.
    now about (he is) going-\textit{ne}
‘(You see) He’s going now.’

b. Hontoni ii kurumada-ne.
really good (is) car-ne
‘(Now I see) This is a really good car!’

Suppose (42a) is uttered when the speaker and hearer see a neighbor’s child going to school at 10 instead of 8 o’clock. It can express the speaker’s attitude that it is a bit late for the child to be going to school. (42b) can be used to say to a car sales person after the speaker test-drives a brand new hybrid car.

An utterance ending with na will imply that the speaker, especially a male speaker, expects something to happen. In (40d), Peter expects that Jane will be coming to him, and at the same time, it may be conveyed that he is prepared to cope with what will happen when she does come.

The Korean language also has various sentence-final particles. First, the sentence-final particle e is claimed to indicate that the propositional content is relevant to the addressee (Noh 2007). “Relevant” means that the information produces a cognitive effect. Consider (43).

(43) a. John-un 6 si-ey ilena-ss-e.
John-Top 6 o’clock-at get up-Pst-e
‘John got up at 6 o’clock.’

b. cha-ka okoiss-e.
car-Nom coming-e
‘A car is coming.’

In (43), the utterances can be interpreted as informing the content to the addressee. It seems to be similar to the Japanese sentence-final particle yo.

Just like the Japanese yo, the Korean sentence-final particle e can be used for warning. If the content is not desirable to the addressee, the utterance can be a warning, as in (44).

(44) a. kuke meku-myen cwuk-e.
That eat-if die-e
‘If you take it, you die.’

b. nayil-un pi-ka nayli-ike-ya.
Tomorrow-Top rain-Nom fall-will-e
‘Tomorrow, it will rain.’

In (44a), it is more likely to be interpreted as a warning, but in (44b), it can be a warning or an expectation, depending on the context.
The sentence-final particle *ney* is claimed to indicate that the propositional content is relevant to the speaker (Noh 2003). In other words, the information may strengthen or eliminate the speaker’s existing assumption, or implicate something new by interacting with the assumption. Consider (45).

   John-Top now school-to go-ney  
   ‘(I see) John is going to school now.’

b. cengmal wihemhan yak-i-ney.  
   really dangerous medicine-be-ney  
   ‘(I see) it is really dangerous medicine.’

When the speaker sees John going to school at 10 o’clock, which is not usual, she may utter (45a). Similarly, when the speaker sees or hears somebody get shocked after taking some medicine, she can say something such as (45b). Here, the particle means that the information is relevant to the speaker (or new to her). For example, the information may eliminate the speaker’s preexisting assumption that the medicine is safe.

So far, we have looked at sentence-final particles in Japanese and Korean. The meanings of these particles contribute to higher-level explicatures, specifically to the speech act of the utterance.

Some sentence-final particles indicate that the information is a metarepresentation of the speaker’s judgment. The Japanese sentence-final particle *(no)da* provides us with an interesting linguistic fact. Uchida (1998) claims that *(no)da* is a marker of interpretive use. Sentence (46) is a typical case of interpretive expressions.

(46) Mado garasu-wo watta no wa Taro da.  
   window glass-Part broke Part Taro-Part  
   ‘It was Taro who broke the window.’

*Da* in (46) explicitly states that the speaker asserts that the man who broke the window was Taro. On the other hand, in (47a) *(no)da* is not allowed because the sentence is a typical descriptive one, where the state of affairs is described and the speaker’s judgment is not involved. Notice that a sentence without *(no)da* is grammatical, as in (47b).

(47) a. ?*Ame-ga futteiru noda.  
   rain-Part falling noda  
   ‘It’s raining-*noda.*’

b. Ame-ga futteiru.  
   ‘It’s raining.’
Sentence (48) is also an instance of descriptive use, so it does not co-occur with \textit{(no)da}.

\begin{align*}
\text{(48)} \quad \text{He’s coming toward us -} & \text{noda.}
\end{align*}

The Korean particle \textit{ci} is also interesting. It is claimed to be used when the speaker “is leaning toward committing himself/herself to or believing in the conveyed message and emphasize that belief.” (Lee 1999:262) In our terms, it is a metarepresentational marker of the speaker’s thought at some other time. (Noh 2016) Consider (49).

\begin{align*}
\text{(49) } & \quad \text{a. Pi-ka oko iss-e.} \\
& \quad \text{Rain-Nom coming-e} \\
& \quad \text{‘(I inform) It is raining.’} \\
& \quad \text{b. pi-kaoko iss-ney.} \\
& \quad \text{Rain-Nom coming-ney} \\
& \quad \text{‘(I see) It is raining.’} \\
& \quad \text{c. pi-ka oko iss-ci.} \\
& \quad \text{Rain-Nom coming-ci} \\
& \quad \text{‘(I know) It is raining.’}
\end{align*}

In (49a), the sentence is used to inform the hearer of raining, and in (49b), it is used to show that the speaker realizes that it is raining. In contrast, in (49c), it indicates that the speaker already knows that it is raining. When the speaker perceives that it is raining through a window, (49a) and (49b) are fine, but (49c) is not. Since \textit{ci} is used when the information is already represented publicly or privately by the speaker, it is a marker of metarepresentation of a representation attributed to the speaker herself at some other time.

3.3. Metarepresentations and private predicates

In relevance theory, metarepresentation is distinguished by the attributedness of the representation. It is further delineated by the degree of resemblance between the original and its representation, or between the representation and metarepresentation.

However, there seems to have been no consideration of the original state of affairs. In Japanese and Korean, representation can be distinguished by the property of the state of affairs to be represented. Whether it is private or public may determine different inflections. The English verb ‘want’ can be expressed in two ways in Japanese, with \textit{-tai} or \textit{-tagatteiru}, depending on which personal pronoun is used as a subject. The simplest case is that \textit{-tai} appears when the subject of the verb phrase is in the first person, as in (50), and \textit{-tagatteiru} occurs with a subject other than the first person, as in (51). (Uchida 2004)
In (50), where *tai* is used, the speaker Bill wants to marry Jill, while in (51), where *tagatteiru* is used, the third party Bill wants to marry Jill. From the perspective of (meta)representation, in (50), the utterance describes the speaker’s own feeling, and in (51), it describes Bill’s behavior that shows his feeling. That is, the former is representing a private state of affairs, and the latter is representing a public state of affairs. Unlike English, in Japanese, these differences are distinguished by different markers.

In reported speech, the same distinction is maintained: in (52), which reports Bill’s utterance about his own feeling (see (50)), -*tai* is used, while in (53), which reports Bill’s utterance about Tom’s behavior that shows his feeling, -*tagatteiru* is used.11)

(50) Bill: *watashi wa Jill to kekkon shi-*tai/-*tagatteiru.*

I Part Jill Part marry want
‘I want to marry Jill.’

(51) Tom: Bill wa *Jill to kekkon shi-*tai/-*tagatteiru.*

Bill Part Jill Part marry want
‘Bill wants to marry Jill.’

(52) Tom: Bill wa *Jill to kekkon shi-*tai/-*tagatteiru* to itta.

Bill Part Jill Part marry want Comp said
‘Bill said he (=Bill) wanted to marry Jill.’

(53) Tom: Bill wa *watashi wa Jill to kekkon shi-*tai/-*tagatteiru* to itta.

Bill Part I Part Jill Part marry want Comp said
‘Bill said I (=Tom) wanted to marry Jill.’

Notice that in (50) and (53) the subjects of *shi-tai/-tagatteiru* are first person, but the grammaticality is reversed. The same behavior of *shi-tai/-tagatteiru* is observed in the case of the third person subjects in (51) and (52). Thus, what is crucial here is the property of the original state of affairs, not the surface subjects. If it is a private state of affairs, it is *tai* which is used, and if it is a representation of a public state of affairs, *tagatteiru* is used. In (52) above, ‘Bill wants to marry Jill’ is Bill’s own private state of affairs, and in (53), on the other hand, the one who wants to marry Jill is ‘I’ not Bill himself.

There is a similar distinction in Korean: *siphta* describes one’s feeling, so it is used when the speaker represents his own feeling. In contrast, when the speaker is not the subject of the feeling, he can only use *siphehata*, which means “behave as if he wants” or “shows the sign of wanting.” Consider (54) and (55).
Just as the Japanese *tai* and *tagatteiru*, the use of *siphta* or *siphehata* in (54) and (55) is determined by the property of the original state of affairs. If it is mental (a feeling), *siphta* is used, and if it is public (a state of affairs), *siphehata* is used.

As in (54) and (55), the use of *siphta* or *siphehata* is determined by what is represented. Thus, even though the subject is not the speaker, as in (56), *siphta* can be used when one’s (mental) feeling is expressed, and as in (57), *siphehata* is used when another’s (public) behavior that shows his/her feeling is reported.

It is interesting to observe a similar grammatical alteration in Japanese and in Korean when private and public states of affairs are reported.

The phenomena that are sensitive to the original state of affairs can also be seen in the behavior of other private predicates that express the feelings or desires of the subjects. For instance, in Japanese, we choose *kanashii* or *kanashigatteiru*, depending upon what is represented. Consider (58) and (59).

(58) Tom: watashi wa kana-shii/-*shigatteiru
    I Part sad
    ‘I am sad.’

(59) Tom: Bill wa kana-*shii/-shigatteiru.
    Bill Part sad
    ‘Bill is sad.’
Utterance (58) represents the speaker’s feeling, so *kanashii* occurs. In (59), on the other hand, the speaker represents a public state of affairs that shows Bill’s feeling. Here *kanashigatteiru* is selected.

The distinction between private and public states of affairs is maintained in metarepresentation. Consider (60)-(61).

(60) a. Tom: Bill wa [kana -shii/-shigatteiru] to itta.
   Bill Part sad Part said

   b. [Tom says [Bill said [Bill was sad]]]

(61) a. Tom: Bill wa [watashi wa kana -*shii/-shigatteiru] to itta.
   Bill Part I Part sad Part said

   b. [Tom says [Bill said [Tom was sad]]]

Utterances (60) and (61) report Bill’s utterance. In (60), the original state of affairs is private, where *kanashii* is used, while in (61), it is public, where *kanashigatteiru* is used. The schemata in (60b) and (61b) are the higher-level explicatures of (60a) and (61b), respectively.

In (60), the subject of the feeling is the third person Bill, and in (61), it is the first person ‘I.’ However, *kana-shii* and *kana-shigatteiru* are used in (60a) and (61a) respectively. Thus, rather than the person of the subject, the property of the original is more accountable: a private state of affairs is used with *kana-shii*, and a public state of affairs is used with *kana-shigatteiru*. The original states of affairs are distinguished between private and public states of affairs.

Similarly, in Korean, private predicates such as *sulphuta* and *sulphehata* ‘be sad’ are sensitive to the original state of affairs. Consider (62)-(63).

(62) Tom: na-nun sulphu-ta.
   I-Top sad-DC
   ‘I am sad.’

(63) Tom: Bill-un *sulphu-ta/sulphehan-ta.
   Bill-Top sad-DC/sad-DC
   ‘Bill is sad.’

When the speaker describes his own private state, he has to choose *sulphuta* ‘be sad’ as in (62) while when he describes a state of affairs that shows one’s feeling, he uses *sulphehata* as in (62) and (63) (*ha* means ‘do’). The sentence *Bill-un sulphuta* ‘Bill is sad’ is possible when the writer is describing Bill’s feeling from the omniscient-viewpoint in a novel. Thus, *sulphuta* is used when it describes a private state of affairs, while *sulphehata* is used for a public state of affairs that we can observe.
Korean private verbs are used in a reported clause, similarly to Japanese, as in (64) and (65), where (64b) and (65b) are the higher-level explicatures of (64a) and (65a) respectively.

\[(64)\] a. Tom: Bill-un [(ku-ka) sulphu-ta/*sulphehan-ta]-ko malhayss-e. 
   Bill-Top [(he-Nom) sad-DC/*sad-DC]-Quot said-e 
   b. [Tom says [Bill said [Bill was sad]]]

\[(65)\] a. Tom: Bill-un [nay-ka *sulphu-ta/sulphehan-ta]-ko malhayss-e 
   Bill-Top [I-Nom sad-DC/sad-DC]-Quot said-e 
   b. [Tom says [Bill said [Tom was sad]]]

In reported speech, *sulphuta* and *sulphehata* are used, as they were used in the original utterances. When it describes a private state of affairs, *sulphuta* is used, while when it describes a public state of affairs, *shlphuhata* is used.

So far, we have looked at Japanese and Korean private expressions. Unlike English, representation and metarepresentation distinguish the private/public state of affairs to be represented in these two languages, depending on whether the private state of affairs is described or whether the public state of affairs (that shows the private states) is described. When the subject is not in the first person, the public state of affairs is described because a private state of affairs is not directly accessible.

### 4. Conclusion

So far, we have shown various metarepresentational phenomena in English, Japanese and Korean, such as reported speech, metalinguistic questions and other attributed metarepresentations. In Japanese and Korean, some types of metarepresentation have to be overtly indicated, through the higher-level explicature (the verb of saying), a quotative particle, a sentence-final particle, etc., while, in English, they can be left implicit.

These similarities and differences might be just accidental characteristics of the languages. However, considering that Japanese and Korean that show similarity have the same SOV word order and English, which is different from the other two languages, is an SVO language, their similarities and differences might be related to their word order. As a matter of fact, Vietnamese, an SVO language is similar to English in its metarepresentational phenomena. It can report others’ utterances, without a verb of saying, as in (9B) above, and they can express metalinguistic questions without ‘they say’ as in (35a-c) (pc. With Professor Do Thu Ha). Thus it is conceivable that the difference between English and Japanese/Korean comes from the difference in word order.

If the difference in metarepresentational phenomena is related to their word order, what specific aspect of word order makes the difference? First of all, many metarepresentational indications in
Japanese and Korean are attached to the predicates. Placing the predicate at the end of the sentence might be responsible for the difference. However, it is not clear why the predicate at the end of a sentence (in Japanese and Korean) has to indicate the presence of metarepresentation, but the predicate in the middle of a sentence (as in English) does not have to. On the other hand, another speculation is possible. In English, non-declarative moods are indicated by word order or verb form. In Japanese and Korean, sentence-types are indicated by sentence final particles. Using a hearsay particle along with (or as) a sentence-final particle is rather simple and easy.

It could be argued that this is somehow related to the pro-drop or zero-subject properties of Japanese and Korean. When there is no overt subject, the subject needs to be hinted indirectly. However, it is not necessarily so. In Japanese and Korean, whether the subject of the reported speech is deleted or not, either the hearsay particle or the verb of saying is necessary. In English, as in (9B), the subject and the verb of saying can be deleted all together. Thus, the zero-subject property may not be responsible for the obligatory use of the verb of saying or a hearsay particle in Korean and Japanese.

Finally, there might be a psychological reason. Japanese and Koreans are sensitive to the source of information. They want to indicate overtly whether it is the speaker’s own idea or someone else’s. This is not a full-fledged idea. It needs further research.

**Abbreviations**

Ac: Accusative case  
Comp: complementizer  
Con: Connective  
DC: Declarative sentence type suffix  
Imp: Imperative sentence type suffix  
Nom: Nominative case  
Part: particle  
Polite: polite form  
Pst: past form  
Q: Interrogative sentence type suffix  
Quot: Quotative particle  
Top: Topic marker

**Notes**

1) Strictly speaking, every utterance is a representation of the speaker’s thought (see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995). John’s utterance, “The German team plays very well,” may be a metarepresentation of his own thought. In this paper, this kind of metarepresentation, that is, a first-order metarepresentation of the speaker’s own thought at the time of speaking will not be distinguished from representation (or description), and will be referred to as a representation.

2) Wilson (2000) presents another kind of metarepresentation, such as, “‘Dragonflies are beautiful’ is a sentence of English.” She calls it ‘abstract metarepresentation,’ where we cannot attribute the thought or utterance “Dragonflies are beautiful” to a particular person.
3) There is a third possible interpretation, “Susan said, ‘You’ve dropped your purse.’” This interpretation will not be discussed in this paper.

4) Uchida (2010) reports a questionnaire in which only 13.7% of the sophomore students at a prestigious university in Japan understood (21) properly, adding the underlined higher-level explicatures in (22). The rest of them tended to translate (21) into Japanese more or less literally, ignoring those higher-level explicatures. This means that this linguistic phenomenon has not been widely recognized in English education in Japan and that the perspective from higher-level explicatures and metarepresentation can be a revolutionary viewpoint in comparing Japanese with Korean and Japanese/Korean with English.

5) One interesting case is the expression relevant to (23 c). As in (i) below, it can be used with *ta*, a declarative sentence type suffix.

(i) manyak John-i-myen, na-nun yeki eps-ta.
   if John-be, I-Nom here not-be-DC
   ‘If it is John, I’m not here.’

When a declarative sentence is embedded, the clause ends with ‘ta.’ Since only *ta* is acceptable, in our view, it is a case of metarepresentation of a desirable thought. This utterance can be used to implicate “If it’s John, suppose that I am not here,” or “If it’s John, tell him that I am not here.”

6) There is another connective *nikka* ‘because,’ which can be used for both cases (in the content domain, and in the speaker’s epistemic or speech act domain).

7) The sentence-particle *e* is not a sentence-type suffix. It can be used in a statement, a question, or an order/request. See section 3.2 for more detail.

8) To use an unmarked form, (36a) and (36b) are paraphrased as in (i) and (ii), respectively.

(i) Watashi wa 6 ji ni oki-ru.
   I Part 6 o’clock at get up-DC
   ‘I get up at six.’

(ii) 6 ji ni oki-ro.
   6 o’clock at get up-IMP
   ‘Get up at six!’

Here *ru* and *ro* are sentence-type suffixes.

9) In relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995), any utterance is used to represent things in two ways. One is ‘metarepresentational use,’ which is divided into ‘interpretive use’ and ‘metalinguistic use.’ An interpretive representation is a conceptual representation of some other utterance or thought. A typical example is indirect speech, where the speaker interpretively conveys what other speakers said or thought. A metalinguistic representation is a formal representation of another utterance or thought. Direct speech will be a typical example.

   The other one is ‘descriptive use.’ A descriptive representation is considered to be true based on the state of affairs in the world. If we say ‘It’s raining,’ we represent the current situation descriptively.


11) This depends on the interpretation that the content of the square bracket in (53) is indirect speech. You can also interpret the content as direct speech. In that case, the behavior of -tai/-tagatteiru is the same as that of (50).

12) The same linguistic phenomenon is observed in Japanese as well. This could be explained if we posit that in a novel the writer can freely metarepresent the characters’ private states of affairs. (See Uchida (2013: 143-144.).)

13) At Inha-Hanoi International Conference, at Hanoi University of Social Sciences and Humanities on 16, Jan. 2015.
References


要 旨

言語間の比較は通例、プロソディ、語彙項目、統語構造、などの文法的な差異に焦点がおかれるが、本研究では、基本語順が同じである、日本語と韓国語の共通性に注目し、メタ表象現象という従来はないと、認知語学からのアプローチをとる。具体的には、このふたつの言語はいずれも高次表現が明示的に具現されるという点で共通の特徴をもち、メタ表象現象の存在を示唆するマーカー、文末部、私的述語（private predicate）などにおいても同じような振る舞いをすることを明らかにする。

【キーワード】関連性理論、高次表意、メタ表象、心的表象、発話表象